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Abstract 
The European Monetary Union (EMU) has removed crucial instruments of macroeconomic 
management from the control of democratically accountable governments. Worse yet, it has 
been the systemic cause of destabilizing macroeconomic imbalances that member states 
found difficult or impossible to counteract with their remaining policy instruments. And even 
though the international financial crisis had its origins outside Europe, the Monetary Union 
has greatly increased the vulnerability of some member states to its repercussions. Its effects 
have undermined the economic and fiscal viability of some EMU member states, and they 
have frustrated political demands and expectations to an extent that may yet transform the 
economic crisis into a crisis of democratic legitimacy. Moreover, present efforts of EMU 
governments to “rescue the Euro” will do little to correct economic imbalances and 
vulnerabilities, but are likely to deepen economic problems and political alienation in both, 
the rescued and the rescuing polities. 
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Preemption of Democracy 
 
Introduction  
In capitalist democracies, governments depend on the confidence of their voters. But 
to maintain this confidence, they also depend on the performance of their real 
economies and, increasingly, on the confidence of financial markets. To meet these 
requirements at the same time is difficult even under the best circumstances. At the 
end of the long period of postwar economic growth, however, theorists of normative 
political economy had postulated the existence of a systemic contradiction between 
the state’s need to ensure democratic legitimacy by responding to citizens’ demands 
for public services and redistribution and the functional requirements of ensuring 
the continuing profitability of a capitalist economy. Depending on their position on 
the left-right spectrum of normative orientations, these authors would interpret the 
expected clash as either a “legitimacy crisis” or as a “governability crisis” of 
democratic capitalism (e.g., Offe 1972; Habermas 1973; Hennis et al. 1978; Schäfer 
2009; Klenk/Nullmeier 2010).  
In the following decades, however, neither of these expectations was confirmed. 
Instead, voters in capitalist democracies seemed to have realized that their well-being 
depended as much on the performance of the capitalist economy as on the public 
goods, services and transfers provided by the democratic state. Obviously, therefore, 
governments would be held politically accountable for the performance of the public 
sector, and its balance of benefits and compulsory contributions. But they would be 
held equally accountable for managing the capitalist economy and ensuring its 
continuing provision of jobs, incomes and consumer goods. In effect, the 
performance, rather than the transformation, of the capitalist economy seems to have 
become a crucial argument of democratic legitimacy. 
Monetary Union, Fiscal Crisis and the Preemption of Democracy 
 
 
 
2 
That presupposes, however, that democratically accountable governments should 
have the capacity to shape the course of their economies. But compared to the 
situation in the early 1970s, the progressive internationalization of economic 
interactions has greatly increased the difficulties of successful economic 
management. At that time, liberalization had been largely confined to product 
markets. National economic policy needed to ensure international competitiveness 
under a balance-of-payments constraint – but it was free in the choice of production 
regimes and in the macroeconomic management of the domestic economy. With the 
increasing integration of capital markets, however, international capital flows 
became decoupled from transactions in product markets, and financial inter-
penetration made national economies vulnerable to crises originating elsewhere. At 
the same time, international, and even more so European rules on product and 
capital market liberalization have imposed legal constraints that eliminated many 
policy options on which governments had previously relied to manage national 
economies. Compared to the period before the 1970s, therefore, successful economic 
management has become much harder. 
In the present essay I will focus on the European Monetary Union (EMU) which has 
removed crucial instruments of macroeconomic management from the control of 
democratically accountable governments. Worse yet, it has been the systemic cause 
of destabilizing macroeconomic imbalances that member states found difficult or 
impossible to counteract with their remaining policy instruments. And even though 
the international financial crisis had its origins outside Europe, the Monetary Union 
has greatly increased the vulnerability of some member states to its repercussions. Its 
effects have undermined the economic and fiscal viability of some EMU member 
states, and they have frustrated political demands and expectations to an extent that 
may yet transform the economic crisis into a crisis of democratic legitimacy. 
Moreover, present efforts of EMU governments to “rescue the Euro” will do little to 
correct economic imbalances and vulnerabilities, but are likely to deepen economic 
problems and political alienation in both, the rescued and the rescuing polities.  
Fritz W. Scharpf 
 
3   
The paper begins with a brief reflection on the problematic relationship between 
democratic legitimacy and macroeconomic management, followed by an equally 
brief restatement of the essential elements of Keynesian and Monetarist policy 
models and their specific political implications. I then try to show how existing 
national regimes have been transformed by the creation of the European Monetary 
Union, and how the destabilizing dynamics of the European monetary policy have 
left some EMU member states dangerously vulnerable at the onset of the 
international financial crisis. In the concluding section, I will examine the likely 
politico-economic and political consequences of programs intended to rescue the 
Euro and to reform the regime of the monetary union. 
 
I:  Democratic Legitimacy and Macroeconomic 
Management. 
After the Great Depression of the 1930s and World War II, governments in Western 
democracies had rejected “socialist” programs of centralized economic planning, but 
had nevertheless assumed political responsibility for preventing the return of similar 
economic catastrophes. This was to be achieved through “macroeconomic” policies 
that would allow the state to increase or reduce aggregate economic demand in order 
to dampen the ups and downs of economic cycles, to prevent the rise of 
unemployment or inflation, and to ensure steady economic growth. The belief that 
macroeconomic management could in fact realize these goals originated in the crisis 
of the 1930s. It was largely confirmed in the “Keynesian” decades after the War, and 
it survived the “Monetarist” counter revolution of the 1980s at least in the sense that 
economic crises continued to be seen as consequences of macroeconomic 
mismanagement. But the very possibility of effective control does then create an 
internal dilemma of democratic legitimacy – or, more precisely, a potential conflict 
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between the input-oriented and the output-oriented dimensions of democratic 
legitimacy (Scharpf 1999, ch. 1).1  
Governments are supposed to carry out the “will of the people”, and they are also 
supposed to serve the “common good”. In the input dimension, therefore, governors 
may be held accountable for policy choices that are in conflict with the politically 
salient preferences of their constituents, whereas in the output dimension, they may 
be sanctioned if outcomes that may be attributed to government policy are seen to 
violate the politically salient concerns of the governed.2 In both dimensions, what is 
initially at stake is political support for the government of the day. But if it appears 
that elections and changes of government cannot make a difference, the democratic 
legitimacy of the political regime itself may be undermined.  
With regard to macroeconomic management, the outcomes that potentially have 
very high political salience are rising mass unemployment and accelerating rates of 
inflation. Since these are not the direct object of policy choices, however, discussions 
of input legitimacy must focus on the policy instruments that may be employed to 
affect outcomes indirectly. In macroeconomic economic theory, these include choices 
in monetary policy, fiscal policy, incomes policy and exchange-rate policy – all of 
which are assumed to have a direct effect on aggregate economic demand and hence 
on economic growth, inflation and employment. They differ greatly, however, in 
their political salience and, hence, in their potential relevance for input-oriented 
democratic legitimacy.  
                                                        
1 The distinction between input- and output-oriented dimensions of democratic legitimacy uses 
the vocabulary of political systems theory (Easton 1965), but has its roots in a much older 
tradition of normative political theory that struggles with the basic tension of having to treat 
governors, at the same time, as agents and as trustees of the people (Scharpf 1970).  
2 Salience is a highly contingent and selective attribute of policy issues or outcome conditions 
that may affect the outcome of elections or incite citizens to engage in political action. And 
whereas accountability for policy choices can be clearly targeted at a particular government, 
accountability for outcomes implies a distinction between events and conditions that are thought 
to be under the potential control of “government”, and others which are ascribed to an “act of 
god”. In multi-level polities, moreover, it is often unclear which level of government is causally 
responsible for which outcomes. But since voters are not obliged to be fair, they will tend to hold 
those governments accountable over which they happen to have electoral control – which in 
Europe is true of national governments, rather than European governing institutions. 
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Under normal conditions, monetary policy has relatively low salience in the electoral 
arena. It is seen to involve highly technical decisions that are best left to specialists in 
central banks and other agencies with an expertise in analyzing and manipulating 
macroeconomic aggregates. Ultimately, of course, these aggregates will also affect 
individuals and firms, and they may have massive distributional consequences. But 
these are not immediately visible, and when they occur, they are not obviously 
related to specific policy choices. The same is true of policies affecting the exchange 
rate. Fiscal-policy, by contrast, while also aiming at the public-sector deficit as an 
aggregate variable, must be implemented through disaggregated taxing and 
spending decisions that have a direct impact on the incomes of individuals and 
firms. And the same would be true if governments should (as they tried to do in 
some countries in the 1970s) adopt incomes policies that impose direct wage controls.  
Unlike monetary policy, therefore, choices of fiscal and incomes policy are liable to 
become politicized. If they should violate the politically salient ex-ante preferences of 
constituencies, they may reduce the electoral support of governments, and in the 
extreme case undermine input legitimacy, regardless of their functional necessity for 
achieving acceptable macroeconomic outcomes. In other words, macroeconomic 
management does create the possibility of a democratic dilemma: By attempting to 
maintain output legitimacy through functionally effective policy choices, governments 
may undermine their input legitimacy − and vice versa. In actual practice, however, the 
intensity of the dilemma depends not only on the type of economic challenges but 
also on the choice between the Keynesian or Monetarist models or paradigms of 
macroeconomic management.  
 
Keynesian problems and the Bundesbank’s Monetarist social compact 
The Keynesian model assigns the leading function to fiscal policy. In a recession, it is 
supposed to expand aggregate demand through tax cuts and deficit-financed 
expenditures; and when the economy is overheating, demand should be reduced 
through tax increases and spending cuts. Monetary policy is supposed to be 
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“accommodating” – that is to finance fiscal expansion at low interest rates and to 
avoid a collapse of domestic demand during fiscal retrenchment. Having been 
conceived in response to the Great Depression of the 1930s, the overriding goal of the 
Keynesian paradigm was to maintain full employment. In the U.S, and the U.K. it 
worked reasonably well in combating recessions during the early postwar decades. 
Even then, however, it was obvious that fiscal retrenchment was politically much 
more difficult to implement than fiscal expansion – which implied continuous 
inflationary pressures and a steady accumulation of public-sector debt.  
Moreover, the British experience demonstrated that ─ under conditions of an 
industrial-relations system with powerful and competitive unions ─ an effective 
incomes policy should have been a necessary complement of fiscal Keynesianism. 
Without it, expansionary fiscal impulses were quickly consumed by wage increases. 
Since statutory wage controls did not seem to work, governments tried to contain 
wage-push inflation through stop-go policies that never allowed steady economic 
growth to take off. In the “stagflation” period of the 1970s, finally, when the oil price 
crisis combined the challenges of demand-deficient unemployment and cost-push 
inflation, the Keynesian model failed almost everywhere. Fiscal expansion would 
have accelerated inflation, and fiscal retrenchment would have driven up mass 
unemployment – and in fact most countries ended up with both. In a few countries, 
however, economically sophisticated and organizationally powerful and centralized 
unions were able to contain cost-push inflation through effective wage restraint, 
allowing fiscal and monetary reflation to prevent the rise of mass unemployment 
(Scharpf 1991). 
The Monetarist paradigm, which has its theoretical roots in pre-Keynesian neoclassical 
economics (Johnson 1971), owed its practical appeal to the collapse of Keynesian 
policies in the 1970s. From a political-science perspective, however, its greatest 
comparative advantage was its lesser dependence on politically salient policy 
choices. Abandoning the political commitment to full employment, the Monetarist 
paradigm assigned the leading role to the monetary policy of an independent central 
bank, whose paramount function is to maintain price stability. Beyond that, it should 
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ensure a steady money supply that was sufficient to allow non-inflationary economic 
growth. Whether it would be realized in practice would then depend entirely on the 
willingness of governments and unions to adjust their claims on the total economic 
product to the monetary corridor defined by the central bank.  
The German Bundesbank was the first to establish a Monetarist regime in the early 
1970s. After having dramatically demonstrated the destructive potential of monetary 
retrenchment in the crisis of 1973/4, the Bank did in fact confront the government 
and the unions with the offer of an implicit “social compact” (Scharpf 1991, 128-139). 
It took great pains to explain, to the government, the unions and the public, how 
coordination by monetary policy would not only ensure price stability but also 
produce economically superior and politically justifiable macroeconomic outcomes. 
Once rampant inflation was brought under control, it would precisely monitor the 
state of the German economy and pre-announce annual monetary targets by 
reference to the current “output gap”. Maximum non-inflationary growth would 
then be achieved if fiscal policy would merely allow the “automatic stabilizers” to 
rise and fall over the business cycle, and if wages would rise with labor productivity. 
Thus fiscal policy would be relieved of its heroic Keynesian role, and unions would 
no longer be pressured to enact a countercyclical incomes policy.   
In other words, responsibility for the management of the economy would be 
assumed by the “non-political” monetary policy of the independent Bank, whereas 
non-inflationary fiscal and wage policies could be conducted with a low political 
profile. And as governments and unions did learn to play by the Bank’s new rules, 
the Monetarist regime did in fact work reasonably well, economically and politically, 
for Germany.3 
 
 
                                                        
3 This is a stylized account that does not apply to conflicts in 1991-92 when the Bank drastically 
(and from its perspective, successfully) intervened against rising public-sector deficits in the 
wake of German unification. 
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II: From Monetarism in One Country to Monetary Union 
Originally, Monetarist as well as Keynesian models had been designed for national 
economies which were exposed to international competition in product markets, but 
retained control over their monetary regimes. For both, therefore, increasing capital 
mobility would raise difficulties. Keynesian reflation would become prohibitively 
expensive if the central bank was no longer able to maintain low interest rates; and 
monetary policy could not be targeted to the “output gap” of the national economy if 
interest rates were determined by the fluctuations of international capital markets. 
This became obvious in the early 1980s, when German recovery was crushed as the 
Bundesbank found it necessary to follow the dramatic increase of American interest 
rates, or when fiscal reflation in France had to be aborted under the pressure of 
massive capital flights. At the same time, capital mobility had also increased the 
volatility of exchange rates, which was seen as a major problem for exporters in 
integrated product markets. There were several reasons, therefore, for European 
governments4 to be interested in creating a common European monetary regime.  
The first such attempt, the European “Snake in the Tunnel” of 1972, had quickly 
disintegrated in the oil-price crisis. Subsequently, the “European Monetary System” 
(EMS) of 1979 committed its member states to peg their currencies to a currency 
basket (the “ECU”). But since Germany was the biggest economy and the most 
important trading partner for most other member states, the EMS meant in fact that 
their currencies were pegged to the Deutschmark – which also implied that in order 
stay within the agreed-upon bandwidth, their central banks needed to mirror the 
stability-oriented monetary policy of the Bundesbank. For the other member states, 
this turned out to be difficult for several reasons: 
First, German monetary policy continued to be precisely targeted to German 
conditions which could differ from those of the other member economies. Hence 
                                                        
4 It should be noted, however, that the initiatives were coming from Germany. With the breakup 
of the Bretton-Woods regime, German producers had lost the protection of an undervalued 
currency, and currency fluctuations were particularly unfavorable for export-oriented 
investment-goods branches operating with high fixed costs. 
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when, in 1992, the Bank decided to punish Helmut Kohl for the deficit-financing of 
German unification, other economies suffered as well − and the U.K. and Sweden 
(that had only recently joined the EMS) were catapulted out of the Monetary System 
by currency speculation. Moreover, governments and unions that had not gone 
through the harrowing German experiences of 1973-75 and 1981-82 did not 
necessarily appreciate the awesome power of monetary constraints. Nor had their 
central banks a background of institutional autonomy, experience and credibility that 
would have allowed them to intervene with equal authority against public-sector 
deficits and wage settlements that diverged from the path defined for Germany.  
Even more important, however, were the institutional differences of national wage-
setting systems. The Monetarist regime worked in Germany because wage 
leadership was exercised by large and economically sophisticated industrial unions 
that had learned to operate within the monetary constraints. In countries with 
powerful, but fragmented and competitive unions and decentralized wage-setting 
institutions, by contrast, unions simply did not have the capacity to contain the 
inflationary pressures of wage competition (Baccaro/Simoni 2010).  
As a consequence, inflation rates (Figure 1) and unit labor costs (Figure 2) continued 
to differ; and in order to compensate for losses of international competitiveness, 
exchange rates and bandwidths were frequently re-adjusted. And as devaluation 
remained a possibility, the risk premia of government bonds differed considerably 
among EMS member states (Figure 3). Moreover, attempts to defend unrealistic 
exchange rates would invite currency speculation.5  
These problems persuaded European governments that moving from the EMS to a 
monetary union with irrevocably fixed exchange rates would be desirable. It would 
end their dependence on the Bundesbank, and it would eliminate the possibility of 
devaluation − and hence both the risk of currency speculation, and the interest-rate 
differentials caused by the risk of devaluation. Germany in turn, which had much to 
                                                        
5 De Grauwe (2009, 137-142) argues that frequent small adjustments had worked well until 
1987, and that it was the attempt to move toward more fixed exchange rates and greater 
convergence that made the EMS too rigid and then invited large-scale currency speculation. 
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lose in a monetary union6 but was willing to accept it as the political price for 
German unification, was able to insist that the Bundesbank and its version of 
Monetarism should become the model for the European system, and that candidate 
countries would have to meet tough convergence criteria as a condition of admission 
(Delors 1989; McNamara 1998; Dyson/Featherstone 1999; Jones 2002; Vaubel 2010).  
In effect, therefore, the Maastricht Treaty did protect the institutional independence 
of the European Central Bank (ECB) even more firmly than had been true in 
Germany. And to ensure its Monetarist orientation, the priority of price stability was 
specified in the Treaty as well. Moreover, in order to gain access to the Monetary 
Union, EU member states had to remove all restrictions on capital mobility, to 
stabilize their exchange rates to the ECU, and to achieve convergence on low rates of 
inflation and low public sector deficits.  
Perhaps unexpectedly, these “Maastricht criteria” on inflation, deficits, and 
exchange-rate stability were in fact met by a considerable number of unlikely 
candidate countries – sometimes through creative accounting, but mainly through 
heroic efforts at budget consolidation and “social pacts” whose short-term 
effectiveness was not necessarily sustainable over the longer term. In an attempt to 
forestall future lapses, therefore, Germany also insisted on a “Stability and Growth 
Pact” that defined permanent limits on national deficits and indebtedness together 
with seemingly tough sanctioning procedures (Heipertz/Verdun 2009).  
 
 
 
                                                        
6 The main loss, as will soon become clear, was the good  fit of monetary policy. But from the 
perspective of export-oriented German industries, the pre-Maastricht EMS had also been an ideal 
arrangement. It was sufficiently effective in dampening currency fluctuations. And it also 
maintained the Deutschmark as an undervalued currency as other member states always tried, 
but never quite succeeded, to match the German passion for stability. This advantage was lost as 
other countries intensified their efforts to meet the Maastricht criteria on price stability, and as 
Germany came to adopt the Euro at an overvalued exchange rate.  
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III: From 1999 to 2007: Monetarism in a Non-optimal 
Currency Area 
Initially, the Monetary Union did indeed fulfill the hopes of its supporters. The 
widely resented dominance of the Bundesbank was replaced by a common European 
central bank that targeted its policy choices on average inflation rates and output 
gaps in the Euro zone, rather than on the state of the German economy. National 
inflation rates that had steeply declined in the run-up to the Euro continued to 
remain significantly lower than they had been in the 1990s (Figure 4) and, most 
importantly, financial markets honored the elimination of devaluation risks, so that 
interest rates on government bonds and commercial credit declined steeply to the 
German level in all EMU member states (Figure 3). The result was an initial boost to 
economic growth in those Euro zone economies where interest rates had fallen – 
which of course was not the case in Germany (Figure 5). Despite the pre-1999 
convergence, therefore, member states entered the EMU in significantly differing 
economic circumstances.  
Such conditions had been discussed earlier under rubric of whether the EMU could 
be considered an “optimum currency area” − deﬁned by high mobility of capital and 
labor and the availability of inter-regional transfers to deal with the possibility of 
“asymmetric shocks” (Mundell 1961; McKinnon 1963; Eichengreen 1990; 
Eichengreen/Frieden 1994). When compared to the United States, these conditions 
were lacking in Europe.7 But given the political commitment to monetary unification, 
and the encouraging effects of national efforts to meet the Maastricht convergence 
criteria, optimism prevailed: Considering national public-sector deficits as the main 
challenge to price stability, and assuming that the Stability Pact would effectively 
                                                        
7 Lars Jonung and Eoin Drea (2010) provide a comprehensive survey of American economic 
analyses of European monetary integration from 1989 to 2002.  They argue that initial 
skepticism was based on a static interpretation of the optimal currency area that ignored the 
dynamic impact of currency union on trade and factor mobility, and that a more optimistic view 
came to prevail in academic analyses as well as the success of the Maastricht convergence criteria 
became apparent. Remarkably, however, none of these contributions seem to have focused on 
differences in wage-setting systems as a factor affecting the conditions of “optimality”, and it 
seems that only Milton Friedman was explicitly worried about the effect of unitary monetary 
policy on divergent member economies (at p. 29).  
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control these, it was expected that the increasing integration of capital and goods 
markets would also ensure a continuing convergence of prices, wages and business 
cycles (Issing 2002). As it turned out, however, these expectations were misleading8 
for two related reasons:  
On the one hand, the political crash programs, through which unlikely candidate 
countries had achieved an impressive convergence on the Maastricht criteria, had 
generally not addressed the underlying structural and institutional differences that 
had originally caused economic divergence. Once access was achieved, these 
differences would reassert themselves (Willett et al. 2010).   
On the other hand, ECB monetary impulses reflected average economic conditions in 
the Euro zone and hence could not be targeted at the conditions of specific national 
economies. In effect, therefore, the crucial precondition of Monetarism – the precise 
fit between the money supply and the growth potential of the specific economy – 
would not exist in a heterogeneous monetary union. In other words, the European 
Central Bank could not be expected to reproduce the Bundesbank’s success in 
Germany. Instead of ensuring steady, inflation-free economic growth in the member 
economies of the EMU, its uniform monetary policy would amplify deviant 
dynamics in economies above and below the average (Sinn et al. 2004; Enderlein 
2004).  
For countries with below-average rates of economic growth and inflation, the 
uniform ECB interest rates were too high, and the real interest rates faced by 
domestic consumers and investors were even higher – with the consequence that 
initially weak economic activity was depressed even further by restrictive monetary 
impulses. For countries with above-average rates of inflation, by contrast, ECB 
monetary policy was too loose, nominal interest rates were too low, and real interest 
rates became extremely low or even negative (Figure 6). Thus, the boost to economic 
                                                        
8 They were right in predicting that (1) monetary union would increase trade flows and capital 
flows, and that (2) increasing trade flows under a common currency would tend to equalize the 
prices of tradable goods and services. There was no reason to think, however, that (3) prices in 
the non-traded sector would be equalized as well. Thus differences in inflation rates could persist 
even though the Euro-level average rate was constrained by ECB monetary policy, and even 
though differences of consumer prices were reduced by price convergence in the traded sector. 
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activity that former weak-currency countries had received through the fall of 
nominal interest to German levels was subsequently intensified and accelerated by 
ECB monetary policy. 
In dealing with the dynamics introduced by miss-specified monetary impulses, the 
Monetary Union left member states to their own devices. Since the “non-political” 
monetary and exchange-rate instruments of macroeconomic management were 
Europeanized, that meant that governments would again have to resort to those 
“Keynesian” instruments of fiscal and incomes policy which, because of their much 
greater political salience, had failed in most countries when they were employed in 
the 1970s. But that is not the complete story. Like its Keynesian counterpart, 
Monetarist theory is ostensibly concerned with the management of aggregate 
economic demand. But unlike Keynesianism, its “micro foundations” are provided 
by neoclassical micro-economics and its postulate of perfect markets. For its 
promoters it seemed plausible, therefore, to consider problems that might still arise 
under a Monetarist regime as the consequence of imperfectly flexible product and 
labor markets. In practice therefore, demand-oriented Monetarist macroeconomics 
was typically associated with a panoply of “supply-side” policy recommendations, 
including tax cuts, privatization, liberalization, deregulation and, if need be, union 
busting (all of which had been part of Margaret Thatcher’s and Ronald Reagan’s 
Monetarist programs). There is no question, however, that the use of these 
instruments would also have very high political salience in EMU member polities.   
 
Germany: The sick man of Europe rescued by union wage restraint 
The first victim of miss-specified monetary impulses was Germany (Spethmann/ 
Steiger 2005). Before 1999, not only nominal interest rates, but also real interest rates 
had been lowest in Germany. With the entry into Monetary Union, however, these 
comparative advantages were lost. Since nominal interest rates converged whereas 
German inflation rates continued to be lower, real interest rates in Germany became 
the highest in the Euro zone (Figure 6). As a consequence, economic growth was 
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lower in Germany than in almost all EMU member economies (Figure 5), 
unemployment increased dramatically from 2000 to 2005 (Figure 7), and so did social 
expenditures, whereas tax revenues fell by 2.4 percentage points from 2000 to 2004.  
In responding to this deep recession, Germany could not rely on any one of the 
instruments of macroeconomic management. Where the Bundesbank would have 
lowered interest rates in response to the rapidly increasing output gap, ECB interest 
rates were causing the problem. And where an autonomous government would have 
resorted to fiscal reflation, Germany came to violate the 3-percent deficit limit of the 
Stability Pact by merely allowing the “automatic stabilizers” to operate. And if 
monetary as well as fiscal reflation was ruled out, incomes policy also could not be 
employed as an instrument of demand expansion. Even if unions had been able, in 
the face of rising mass unemployment, to achieve wage increases exceeding 
productivity gains plus inflation, the positive effect on domestic demand would have 
been overshadowed by job losses due to reduced profitability and falling export 
demand.  
Instead, Germany’s large industrial unions in the export sectors decided to protect 
existing jobs through wage restraint – a supply-side strategy that allowed employers 
to capture most of productivity gains in the hope of stabilizing employment by 
improving the profitability of domestic production and the competitiveness of 
German industries in international markets.9 At the same time, however, stagnant or 
falling real wages (Figure 8) would further reduce domestic demand and keep 
inflation below the EMU average – with negative effects on domestic economic 
growth and on imports. And the Red-Green government on its part, bereft of all 
demand-side policy options, was also pushed toward supply-side policies. Between 
2000 and 2005, the government managed to reduce taxes on company profits and 
capital incomes, to lower the level of employment protection, primarily by 
deregulating temporary and part-time employment (Figure 9), and to drastically cut 
benefits to the long-term unemployed in order to reduce the reservation wage of job 
                                                        
9 In real terms, German unions helped to re-establish the advantages of an undervalued currency 
– providing the functional equivalents of export subsidies and import duties in ways which could 
not be challenged under the EU’s competition and internal-market rules. 
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seekers (Trampusch 2009). There is no question that these policies were not only 
highly salient but also extremely unpopular, especially with the supporters of the 
social-democratic governing party. Mass demonstrations against the welfare reforms 
and the rise of a left-wing protest party brought about the defeat of the Red-Green 
government in the 2005 elections. And beyond this change of partisan fortunes, there 
is also a significant decline of lower-class electoral participation – which does indeed 
suggest a more serious erosion of political legitimacy (Schäfer 2010). 
Economically, however, the combination of extreme wage restraint practiced by 
German unions and the government’s supply-side policies achieved its hoped-for 
effect. Export demand and eventually employment in the export industries and in a 
growing low-wage sector increased, and registered unemployment began to decline 
after 2005 (Figure 7). In effect, Germany which had been the “sick man of Europe” 
between 2000 and 2005, managed to pull itself out of the long recession to become 
once more one of the strongest European economies at the onset of the international 
financial crisis in 2007.  
In an integrated economic environment, however, successful supply-side policies 
which reduce the cost and increase the profitability of domestic production in one 
country must inevitably have the effect of beggar-my-neighbor strategies on its 
competitors (De Grauwe 2009, 112; Flassbeck 2010). In the process of coping with its 
own crisis, therefore, Germany also contributed to the economic vulnerability of 
other Euro zone economies, and to the increasing current-account imbalances among 
Euro zone economies (Figure 10).10 
 
 
                                                        
10 The link is established by a combination of three different mechanisms: By cutting costs and 
constraining domestic demand, Germany increased exports and reduced imports in relation to 
the rest of the world. Since revenues from the export surplus were not fully consumed or 
invested in Germany, they were available for investment and credit in those economies where, 
for reasons to be discussed below, demand for consumer and investment credit was particularly 
high. In effect therefore, German capital exports came to finance rising imports and increasing 
indebtedness in recipient economies.  
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The rise and increasing vulnerability of GIPS economies 
In the former soft-currency countries – I will look at Greece, Ireland, Portugal and 
Spain, labeling them GIPS economies – accession to the EMU had the initial effect of 
interest rates falling to much lower German levels. The sudden availability of cheap 
capital, whose domestic attractiveness was further increased by near-zero or even 
negative real interest rates, fuelled credit-financed domestic demand in Greece, 
Ireland and Spain (though less so in Portugal, for reasons that I have not been able to 
explore). In Spain and Ireland, in particular, cheap credit came to finance real-estate 
investments and rapidly rising housing prices which, eventually, would turn into 
bubbles. As a consequence, economic growth (Figure 5), employment (Figure 11), 
per-capita incomes (Figure 12) and prices (Figure 4) continued to increase. At the 
same time, real wages (Figure 8) and unit labor costs (Figure 13) increased as well.11 
As a consequence, imports would rise, export competitiveness would suffer and 
deficits of current accounts would increase (Figure 10).  
Even if they had considered the decline of their external balances a serious problem, 
however, the governments in GIPS economies found no effective way to counteract 
domestic booms that were driven by the cheap-money effect of uniform ECB interest 
rates. Spain and Ireland had at least tried to achieve some restraint through the 
instruments of macroeconomic policy that were still available nationally. But their 
attempts to contain wage inflation through a series of social pacts (Baccaro/Simoni 
2010) and to practice fiscal constraint by running budget surpluses (Figure 15) 
proved insufficient. What could have made a difference was monetary restraint that 
would have impeded the credit-financed overheating of the Greek, Irish and Spanish 
                                                        
11 The mechanism is complex: The initial fall of interest rates facilitated the rise of credit-financed 
consumer and investment demand. In the traded sector, imports would rise, prices would be 
constrained, and employment might fall. In the non-traded sector, however, increasing demand 
would raise domestic production and employment and create room for wage increases. Whether 
it will be exploited depends on national wage-setting institutions. In Sweden and Austria, 
centralized wage bargaining was generally able to prevent increases that would hurt 
international competitiveness in the traded sector. In Germany, the same effect is traditionally 
achieved by the wage leadership of the big industrial unions. But where such institutions do not 
exist, union competition and egalitarian norms of “comparability” will favor the diffusion of wage 
increases achieved in branches with the greatest ability to pay, or the least ability to resist 
(Scharpf 1991; Baccaro/Simoni 2010). In the traded sector, therefore, wages may rise even as 
employment is shrinking.  
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economies. This, however, would have required differentiated, rather than uniform, 
monetary policies that would not be defined by Eurozone averages, but would be 
targeted to the specific conditions and problems of individual economies.12 Such 
ideas,13 however, had played no role in the construction of either the European 
Monetary Union or of the Stability Pact (Heipertz/Verdun 2009), nor have they been 
considered by mainstream monetary economics before the present crisis (De Grauwe 
2009; but see, De Grauwe 2011).14 Under the dominant view, the ECB was only 
responsible for average price stability in the Eurozone as a whole, whereas all 
adjustment problems of individual economies should be dealt with by EMU member 
states.  
At the onset of the financial crisis, therefore, the GIPS economies found themselves in 
extremely vulnerable positions defined by severe current-account deficits, an 
extreme dependence on capital inflows and severely overvalued real exchange rates. 
For countries with independent currencies (unless that currency was the U.S. Dollar), 
this process could not have continued very long. Under fixed exchange rates, it 
would be stopped by a balance-of-payments crisis, and if rates were flexible, 
devaluation would raise the price of imports and restore the competitiveness of 
exports. In the Monetary Union, however, external constraints were eliminated. 
Foreign investors and creditors no longer worried about currency risks, and banks in 
countries like Germany were happy to re-invest export incomes in bonds and asset-
based securities issued by Greek, Spanish or Irish banks. Hence the rapidly 
                                                        
12 De Grauwe (2009, 177-182) shows how the higher interest rates required (under the “Taylor 
rule”) for high growth economies like Ireland, Greece or Spain would be systematically outvoted 
in the ECB Governing Council under the influence of the ECB Board whose members are assumed 
to target average Euro-zone conditions.  
13 In the history of economic theory, the need for and the feasibility of differentiated solutions 
had been postulated by the renowned Swedish economist Erik Lindahl (1930). In his view, the 
central bank of a monetary union of independent states would need to correct diverging business 
cycles and inflation rates in member economies by differentiating the supply of central-bank 
money that national central banks could offer to national banks – which would in turn lead to 
nationally differing interest rates. It has recently been argued, albeit by heterodox economists, 
that such options could also be realized in the EMU (Spethmann/Steiger 2005). 
14 One would of course need to know whether, under present conditions of high capital mobility, 
the effect of differentiated monetary policies would be immediately wiped out by arbitrage, or 
whether some forms of capital controls could be designed to ensure their effectiveness. 
Moreover, one would have to explore the political and intra-institutional implications for ECB 
monetary policy if it were to become responsible for explicitly discriminating measures 
addressed to individual member economies.  
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increasing deficits of current accounts were not corrected, but financed through 
equally increasing capital flows from surplus to deficit economies in the Euro zone 
(Figure 14).  By the same token, of course, real effective exchange rates diverged as 
well, with Germany benefitting from an increasingly undervalued currency, and 
GIPS economies suffering from over-valuation (Figure 17).  
What did matter most, eventually, was the increasing dependence on capital inflows 
and the rise of external – and mainly private15 – indebtedness, which left GIPS 
economies extremely vulnerable to disturbances of international financial markets 
that might provoke capital flight.16 Hence even if the toughened version of the 
Stability Pact that is presently being enacted had been in place in 2007, it would 
hardly have reduced the economic vulnerability of the GIPS economies. In any case, 
however, under the rules of the Monetary Union that were then in place neither 
rising current-accounts deficits, nor the increasing dependence of GIPS economies on 
capital imports and divergent real exchange rates were treated as problems that 
would require intervention by either the Commission or the European Central Bank. 
The Stability Pact was supposed to deal only with excessive budget deficits (Figure 
15) and, what is even more important, it did not differentiate between deficits 
incurred in a recession and in high-growth periods. Thus after Germany (with the 
support of France) had successfully resisted punishment for the operation of 
automatic stabilizers during its deep recession between 2000 and 2005 it would have 
been politically difficult to prosecute high-growth Greece (even if its deficit had been 
correctly reported). But while the Stability Pact could and should have worked 
against Greece, it was simply irrelevant for Spain and Ireland. Compared to 
Germany, their governments were models of fiscal probity, running budget 
                                                        
15 In contrast to currently popular narratives, external indebtedness even in Greece and Portugal 
was mainly, and in Spain and Ireland it was exclusively, due to private-sector, rather than public-
sector borrowing. Thus in 2007, the year before the financial crisis, the external balance of 
Greece had amounted to -14.67% of GDP, to which public-sector borrowing contributed only -
5.3%. The respective figures for Portugal are -9.78% and -2.65%. In Spain (-10.02% and + 
1.09%) and Ireland (-5.34% and +0.14%), public sector surpluses actually had reduced the 
external imbalance (Eurostat data). 
16 Excessive external indebtedness caused by capital inflows did of course also occur in countries 
with their own currency whose central bank had stimulated the demand for credit through low 
interest rates. But in that case, a sudden capital flight would produce devaluation, rather than a 
liquidity and solvency crisis (de Grauwe 2011). 
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surpluses in most years up to 2007, and reducing total public-sector debt far below 
the official target of 60 percent of GDP (Figure 16). Even though, in the absence of 
monetary restraint,  sound macroeconomic management might have required even 
more aggressive fiscal retrenchment, there was nothing in the Stability Pact that 
would have suggested to governments that this might be a European requirement.  
At the same time, the ECB also would see no reason for alarm as average Euro-zone 
inflation rates remained within the limits to which its monetary policy was 
committed. And while all the GIPS economies had higher rates than Germany, these 
were not exorbitantly higher and they did not seem to accelerate (Figure 4). That may 
appear surprising since the bursting of credit-financed real-estate bubbles in Ireland 
and Spain is now seen as a major cause of the present crisis in these countries. But 
technically, escalating real-estate and housing prices are defined as “asset price 
inflation” which the ECB, like other central banks, will only take into account if their 
“wealth effect” may be expected to affect the rise of consumer prices as well (Trichet 
2005; de Grauwe 2009, 207-209).17 And the rise of consumer prices in GIPS economies 
continued to be constrained by lower-priced imports. 
 
Summary: The Eurozone on the eve of the crisis 
By 2007, therefore, conditions in the Eurozone could be described as follows: The 
Monetary Union had achieved its proximate political purposes by eliminating 
currency fluctuations and interest-rate differentials among its member economies. At 
the same time, however, it had deprived member governments of the monetary and 
exchange-rate instruments of macroeconomic management and it had tried, through 
the Stability Pact, to also constrain their employment of fiscal instruments. But since 
the Eurozone was not an “optimal currency area”, the imposition of one-size-fits-all 
                                                        
17 By hindsight it seems clear that the Irish and Spanish (or American and British) governments 
might have stopped their real-estate bubbles through legislation tightening the availability of 
housing credit. But if even central-bank economists see no way to distinguish between price 
increases determined by “rational markets” and “speculative” excesses, it would have taken a 
good deal of political courage for governments to stop the party on grounds of old-fashioned 
paternalism.  
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ECB interest rates produced “asymmetric” impulses in EMU economies with above-
average or below-average rates of growth and inflation. In low-growth Germany, 
high real interest rates had deepened and prolonged a recession which, since 
monetary as well as fiscal reflation were ruled out, was eventually overcome through 
wage restraint and supply-side “reforms” that constrained domestic demand and 
increased export competitiveness. In GIPS economies, by contrast, very low real 
interest rates had fueled credit-financed economic growth and employment, but also 
rapid increases in unit labor costs that reduced export competitiveness. The resulting 
rise of current-account deficits was accommodated by equally rising capital inflows 
from investors in surplus economies leading rising external debts accumulated 
primarily or exclusively in the private sector. As a consequence, GIPS economies 
were becoming extremely vulnerable to potential disturbances in international 
financial markets that might induce capital flight – followed by potential liquidity 
and solvency crises.  
Governments in GIPS countries may have been as unconcerned as the American or 
British governments about the rise of these imbalances. But even where they tried to 
constrain their overheating economies through fiscal retrenchment and attempts at 
wage moderation, the instruments of macroeconomic policy that were still available 
to national governments proved insufficient to neutralize the expansionary effects of 
EMU monetary impulses. At the same time, moreover, the escalating economic 
imbalances and vulnerabilities were of no concern for EMU policy makers, neither 
for the Commission enforcing the Stability Pact nor for the ECB carrying out its 
mandate to ensure price stability.  
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IV: From 2008 to 2010: A Sequence of Three Crises 
For how long external imbalances in the Euro zone could have continued, whether 
they could have been gradually corrected by market forces or would soon have 
ended in a crash, has become an academic question. In the real world, the 
international financial crisis of 2008 did trigger chain reactions which, in the 
Eurozone, had the effect of transforming the vulnerability of the deficit countries into 
a systemic crisis that is thought to challenge the viability of the Monetary Union 
itself. The much-researched story is far too complex to be retold here in any detail, 
but for present purposes a thumb-nail sketch of three distinct, but causally connected 
crises will suffice (Jones 2009).  
Initially, the direct impact of the American “subprime mortgage crisis” and the 
Lehman bankruptcy was limited to European countries that had allowed their banks 
to invest heavily in “toxic” American securities. Apart from the UK, the main victims 
were Germany and Ireland, whereas in Spain banking supervision had effectively 
prevented Spanish banks from engaging in off-balance activities abroad. As a 
consequence, the budget deficits of countries that had to rescue “system-relevant” 
private or public banks, escalated to previously unheard-of levels (Figure 15).   
The secondary impact of the international financial crisis was a dramatic credit 
squeeze on the real economy as banks had to write off insecure assets on their 
balance sheets while interbank lending was stopped by mutual distrust. As a 
consequence, economic activity declined and unemployment increased in the 
countries immediately affected by the banking crisis, and these effects spread quickly 
to closely-linked other economies. In addition to the fiscal effects of bank bailouts, 
therefore, governments had to accept a steep decline of tax revenues and an equally 
steep rise of expenditures on unemployment and on the protection of existing jobs. 
Quite obviously, however, the effects of the credit squeeze would hit hardest on 
countries whose economic activity had come to depend most on the availability of 
cheap credit and massive capital inflows– which in the Euro zone had been true of 
the GIPS economies. In Ireland and Spain, moreover, the real-estate bubble had burst 
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under the impact of the recession, and the defaults of mortgages created a secondary 
banking crisis in which governments had to rescue even more financial institutions 
(or their creditors in the financial institutions of surplus economies). The result was 
an even more dramatic rise of public-sector deficits and debt ratios even in countries 
like Spain and Ireland whose indebtedness had been far below the Eurozone average 
(Figure 16).  
In the process, thirdly (and belatedly), international rating agencies and investors 
ceased to be satisfied with the elimination of currency risks and finally began to 
worry about the sustainability of public-sector indebtedness – in particular for 
countries whose current-account deficits suggested economic weaknesses that might 
also affect the capacity of governments to meet financial commitments. As this 
happened, the price of outstanding bonds declined, refinancing as well as the 
placement of new issues became difficult, and the convergence of nominal interest 
rates on German levels came to an end. As a consequence, risk premia on sovereign 
debt rose to very high and practically prohibitive levels after 2008 (Figure 18).  
The specter of “sovereign default” arose first in Greece. There, the incoming Pasok 
government had to admit that public sector deficits (which had significantly violated 
the Stability Pact even during the high-growth years following accession to the Euro 
zone in 2001) had in fact been grossly under-reported by its predecessors. 
Confronted with the potential repercussions of Greek bankruptcy on their own 
banks, and with speculative attacks on other EMU member states, capital-exporting 
countries agreed to create a common “Stability Mechanism” that would ensure 
Greek government obligations − which was soon followed by a much larger 
European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF) whose guarantees were first invoked by 
Ireland and now also by Portugal. In all cases, governments had to accept extremely 
tough commitments to fiscal retrenchment and supply-side policy reforms – which 
are becoming the model for a general regime of fiscal supervision and controls in the 
Eurozone.  
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V: Beyond the Rescue Operations: Options for a Viable 
EMU? 
The commitment to create the rescue funds must be understood in the light of its 
perceived alternative: If GIPS states had gone bankrupt they could have left the 
Monetary Union and returned to their former national currencies at an exchange rate 
that corrected the real effective over-valuation. In theory, that would have re-
established the international viability of their economies. But domestically the 
transition would have been very painful, and its technical difficulties were perceived 
as being so overwhelming18 that no practical solutions in that direction were even 
tentatively considered. At the same time, the European Commission, the ECB and 
the governments of surplus countries also rejected the “bankruptcy-cum-
devaluation” scenario for reasons of their own which, not necessarily in the order of 
their importance, could be listed as follows: (1) if GIPS states should leave the EMU, 
it would be perceived as a major setback for European integration; (2) it would 
encourage speculative attacks on other EMU member states; (3) the bankruptcy of 
GIPS states would entail heavy losses for banks in surplus countries and for the ECB, 
and (4) the expected revaluation of the Euro would hurt export industries in 
Germany and other surplus economies that benefited from an undervalued real 
exchange rate. Given these beliefs, the expensive guarantees and credits appeared as 
a lesser evil that was necessary to keep the GIPS countries within the Monetary 
Union (and, perhaps, to provide a push for European solidarity and political 
integration).  
 
 
 
                                                        
18 As George Selgin (2010) put it: “In effect, the authorities kicked away the ladder Europe’s 
economies had scaled to establish a common currency, leaving Europeans with no equally 
convenient way of retreating to the status quo.” Thus American economists who had warned 
against creating the EMU were now convinced that the exit option was effectively foreclosed 
(Eichengreen 1990; 2010).  
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The rescue-cum-retrenchment program 
The immediate goal of the rescue programs was to avoid bankruptcy by providing 
access to immediately needed credit at rates that did not include exorbitant risk 
premia. This goal is being pursued through a combination of guarantees, ECB open 
market operations (Sinn 2011) and direct loans provided by the IMF and by the 
stability funds set up by the EU (EFSM) and by the EMU member states (EFSF).  As a 
consequence, Greece, Ireland and now Portugal have so far been able to avoid 
insolvency. By themselves, however, the guarantees and credits could only buy time. 
In order to ensure that governments will be able to restore the confidence of financial 
markets, they are coupled with stringent “conditionalities” which are meant to 
reduce the short-term need for credit through rigorous fiscal retrenchment. At the 
same time, moreover, the conditions imposed are meant to facilitate economic 
recovery and to restore the international viability of the economies in question.  
Thus the Commission’s “Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece” of May 2010 
postulated two goals to be pursued over the coming years:  
 “The immediate priority is to contain the government’s financing 
needs and reassure markets of the determination of authorities to do 
whatever it takes to secure medium- and long-term fiscal 
sustainability.” …  
In parallel with short-term anti-crisis fiscal measures, there is a need 
to prepare and implement an ambitious structural reform agenda to 
strengthen external competitiveness, accelerate reallocation of 
resources from the non-tradable to the tradable sector, and foster 
growth.” (Commission 2010a, 10/90). 
The Program accordingly included immediate increases of VAT and excise taxes, 
cuts of public-sector wages, pensions, social expenditures and public investments, 
and it would continue in 2011─2014 with long lists of further tax increases and 
expenditure cutbacks. The structural reforms to which the government had to 
commit itself included “the implementation of an ambitious pension reform”, 
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reforms of the budgeting and tax systems and of public administration, plus 
“ambitious labor and product market reforms.” 
And even though some of these commitments might have appeared somewhat 
vague, they were specified in much greater detail and continuously tightened by a 
“Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality” 
(Memorandum 2010) and its quarterly “updates”. These are used to assess progress 
achieved, to extend the range of required structural reforms and to specify concrete 
requirements to be met in the following periods19. These “Memoranda of 
Understanding” and their quarterly updates cut ever more deeply into details of 
national legislation.20 And the opening paragraphs of the Greek and Irish 
Memoranda and of all subsequent updates leave no doubt as to who is in control of 
these “understandings”: 
 “”The quarterly disbursements of bilateral financial assistance …are 
subject to quarterly reviews of conditionality for the duration of the 
arrangement. The release of the tranches will be based on observance 
of quantitative performance criteria and a positive evaluation of 
progress made with respect to policy criteria in …this memorandum….  
The authorities commit to consult with the European Commission, the 
ECB and the IMF on the adoption of policies that are not consistent 
with this Memorandum. They will also provide the European 
Commission, the ECB and the IMF with all information requested that 
is available to monitor progress during programme implementation 
and to track the economic and financial situation. Prior to the release 
                                                        
19 Exactly the same approach has been used in the “Economic Adjustment Programme for 
Ireland” published in February 2011 (Commission 2011), and there is no reason to think that it 
will not also be used for Portugal. 
20 To illustrate, in the Greek case, the “second update” of 22 November 2010 contained a 
commitment to “comprehensive reform of the health care system” which in the “third update” of 
23 February 2011 came to include detailed targets for the pricing of generics and for the methods 
by which social security funds are paying physicians. Similarly, where the original agreement had 
contained a commitment to ”ambitious labor market reforms”, the second update specified a new 
law allowing firm-level collective agreements to prevail over sector and occupational 
agreements, and the third update committed the government to “simplify the procedure for the 
creation of firm-level trade unions”.  In the Irish case, the “Memorandum of Understanding” of 8 
December 2010 was more detailed on reforms of the banking system but also included precise 
commitments on labor market and pension reforms, on cuts in public-sector employment and 
pay, on cuts in social programs and reductions of the statutory minimum wage. 
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of the instalments, the authorities shall provide a compliance report on 
the fulfilment of the conditionality.”21 
In other words, once an EMU member state has applied for the protection of 
European rescue funds, its government will be operating under a form of 
“receivership”.22 European and IMF authorities will define the criteria to be treated 
as “conditionality”; the Commission will analyze financial and economic problems, 
define the policy choices that are required, monitor compliance and evaluate 
progress or failure. Of course it will prefer to do so in consultation with national 
authorities and expertise. But in cases of disagreement, the bargaining power of the 
national government will be minimal – except that it might still threaten to commit 
political suicide or to reconsider the “bankruptcy-cum-devaluation” option.  
Whether the policies imposed by these “rescue-cum-retrenchment” regimes, 
assuming that they would be faithfully implemented, have a chance of succeeding 
economically over the medium term appears doubtful. The short-term results, at any 
rate, do not appear promising: Total debt burdens are still increasing (Figure 16), and 
the interest rates for government bonds seem to be still on the rise as well (Figure 19). 
At the same time, GIPS economies continue to be in a deep recession, with negative 
or near-zero rates of economic growth in 2010 and 2011, and with unemployment 
rates of 15 percent in 2011 in Greece, 14 percent in Ireland, 11-12 percent in Portugal 
and 20 percent in Spain23 (Figure 20). In order to meet their minimal political 
responsibilities, therefore, governments must deal with high and rising expenditures 
on unemployment and welfare benefits and they must cope with falling, rather than 
rising tax revenues – with the implication that despite current denials a severe 
“restructuring” of existing debt may become unavoidable.  
 
                                                        
21 Quoted from the Irish Memorandum of 3 December 2010: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/articles/eu_economic_situation/pdf/2010-12-07-
mou_en.pdf. 
22 In the recent blog of Max Keiser, a British TV presenter and former Wall Street broker, the 
Greek situation is equated with an occupation regime imposed by the “Troika” of EU, ECB and 
IMF authorities. <http://maxkeiser.com/2011/04/28/the-greek-government%E2%80%99s-
betrayal-of-greece-to-the-foreign-occupational-forces-of-the-troika> 
23 IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2011.  
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/01/pdf/tblpartb.pdf> 
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Political implications 
In purely economic terms, therefore, the immediate outcomes of the “rescue-
cum-retrenchment” program will not differ greatly from those anticipated in the 
“bankruptcy-cum-devaluation” scenario. In both cases, creditors cannot expect to be 
fully repaid, and in both cases, international economic viability can only be re-
achieved by a fall of wages in the traded sector that will real correct the gap in real 
effective exchange rates (Figure 17). But the political implications and distributional 
consequences would be quite different.  
“Bankruptcy-cum-devaluation” would be experienced as a sudden shock that 
hits the country as a whole and which, by dramatically increasing the price of 
imports, reduces all domestic real incomes at the same time. Beyond that, however, 
all cruelties would have been inflicted by the devaluation itself, and national policy 
and politics could be about damage control, burden sharing and reconstruction.  
The opposite is true under the “rescue-cum-retrenchment” program that is 
presently being enacted. Here, all cruelties must be proposed, defended, adopted 
and implemented over an extended period by the national government. In fact, the 
program amounts to a greatly radicalized version of the supply-side reforms 
adopted in Germany during its (much milder) recession before 2005 – which 
destroyed the political support of the Schröder’s Red-Green government. But 
whereas Schröder had the chance of developing and defending self-chosen reforms, 
governments in Greece, Ireland and Portugal must implement policies which are 
likely to be seen as dictates of Commission bureaucrats and of self-interested foreign 
governments trying to protect their own banks, investors and export industries.  
If these are extremely difficult political conditions, they will be exacerbated 
by the distributional implications. In both scenarios it is clear that the non-traded 
sector will lose, and that export-oriented industries and services ought to gain. 
Beyond that, however, the higher profitability of investments in export-oriented 
production will have been achieved by the devaluation itself, whereas in the “rescue-
cum-retrenchment” program it must be created by governments adopting and 
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implementing policies that must massively and visibly hurt workers and welfare 
clients while favoring profits and capital owners. As was true in Germany, the 
inevitable result will be a rise of social inequality24 and social protest. From the 
political perspective of GIPS governments, therefore, “bankruptcy-cum-devaluation” 
might by now indeed appear as the lesser of two evils. 
 
From rescue operations to EMU reform 
But the fate of the economies and governments of GIPS countries is only part of a 
larger process of EMU reforms that are presently under way. In this regard, it is 
indeed unfortunate that worries about the Euro were triggered by the Greek 
solvency crisis – which initially was seen as the self-inflicted result of fiscal 
profligacy: If Greek governments had not engaged in reckless borrowing,25 so it is 
now widely argued, the Euro crisis would not have arisen, and if the Commission 
had not been duped by faked records, the rigorous enforcement of the Stability Pact 
would have prevented it. So even though the more “virtuous” member states cannot 
refuse to help the “sinners” now, such conditions should never be allowed to occur 
again. And even though this understanding of the problem was only partly correct 
for Greece, and totally wrong for Ireland and Spain, it still dominates discussions of 
the crisis in the “rescuer” countries, and it does frame the approach to reforming the 
EMU regime.  
The “Excessive Deficit Procedure” (EDP) that is to be put into place under Article 126 
TFEU amounts to a toughened version of the Stability Pact − with greater emphasis 
on the rapid and continuous reduction of total public-sector debt, on the preventive 
supervision of national budgeting processes, on earlier interventions and sanctions 
and “reverse majority” rules for the adoption of more severe sanctions by the 
                                                        
24 In fact, Germany was one of the OECD countries where social inequality increased the most 
between the mid 1990s and the mid 2000s – whereas inequality had decreased in Greece, Spain 
and Ireland (OECD 2008). 
25 A major factor seems to have been a particularly pronounced inability or unwillingness to 
collect taxes. According to OECD figures, Greek tax revenue declined from 37.8 percent of GDP in 
2000 to 32.6 percent in 2008.  
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Council (Commission 2010b).26 But at least the Commission also seems to have 
realized that mere budgetary discipline alone, no matter how rigidly enforced, 
would not have prevented the crises of Ireland and Spain – where the steep rise of 
public-sector deficits clearly was a consequence, rather than the cause, of the 
financial and economic crisis.  
Hence the Commission now also considers “macroeconomic imbalances” as 
proximate causes of the present crises, and it has proposed to strengthen the Treaty 
commitment to coordinated economic policy (Art. 121 TFEU) by an “Excessive 
Imbalance Procedure” (Commission  2010c). Its focus will be on current account 
balances, unit labor costs, real effective exchange rates total (public and private) 
indebtedness and other potentially critical aspects of national economic performance. 
Its central instrument will be a “scoreboard” with a limited (but expandable) list of 
performance indicators, complete with upper and lower “alert thresholds”. On this 
basis, “complemented by economic judgment and national expertise”, the 
Commission will then identify member states “deemed at risk of imbalance”, 
followed by “country-specific in-depth reviews”, “preventive recommendations” 
and in the case of “excessive imbalances”, Council recommendations of corrective 
action, with deadlines attached and with compliance to be monitored by the 
Commission. If governments fail to comply, the Commission may again propose 
fines that the Council could only oppose by qualified majority vote.27  
This ambitious program, which had the support of the Van-Rompuy Committee, was 
approved by the ECOFIN Council on March 15, 2011,28 and it is supposed to be 
adopted in June through a series of regulations. It appears remarkable for a number 
of reasons. First, it replaces the rule-based approach of the Maastricht Treaty and the 
original Stability Pact with a highly discretionary regime of supranational economic 
                                                        
26 At the same time, however, the proposed Regulation (7843/11) seems to soften some of the 
rigidities of the original Stability Pact by relating its deficit rules to the “medium-term rate of 
potential GDP growth” ─ which obviously place much trust on the reliability of economic 
forecasts or give much room to discretionary judgments of the Commission.  
27 In none of the legislative proposals, either for the EDP or the EIP, is there any suggestion that 
the adoption of “reverse majority” rules might require amendments of the Treaty. But see:  
<http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/danielhannan/100056867/herman-van-rompuy-
announces-a-new-reverse-majority-rule-to-get-around-the-national-veto> 
28 <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/119888.pdf> 
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management. Even the new EDP will now refer to projections of “potential growth” 
for its assessment of national budgets. And the EIP must depend on disputable 
hypotheses regarding the causal relevance of specific indicators and the critical 
significance of upper and lower thresholds (quite apart from the politically 
unresolved issue of whether symmetrical controls should be imposed on surplus and 
deficit economies). Moreover, practically all the indicators discussed refer to 
phenomena which, unlike public-sector budgets, are not under the direct control of 
national governments. Since the capacities of governments to exercise indirect 
influences over such variables as nominal wages, private saving and spending, 
consumer credit, etc. may either not exist or differ enormously among member 
states, compliance with the “recommendations” issued by the Commission may well 
be impossible.  
 
The worst of three worlds 
Remarkably, moreover, there is no acknowledgment in any of the supporting 
documents of the role that uniform ECB interest rates played in causing 
macroeconomic imbalances among the heterogeneous member economies of a “non-
optimal currency area”. Nor is there any recognition of the ECB’s reluctant but 
constructive role in supporting GIPS banks after 2008, or any discussion of how ECB 
monetary policy could, in the future, avoid monetary impulses that have the effect of 
generating imbalances among EMU economies.29 In other words, EMU member 
states cannot expect any help from the European level in managing the 
macroeconomic imbalances that are induced by European monetary impulses that do 
not fit the specific conditions of the national economy. Instead, they are expected to 
deal with potential imbalances through the use of their remaining policy instruments 
− but in doing so, they will be constrained by the rules of the Excessive Deficit 
                                                        
29 The omission seems particularly surprising since real interest rates are now lower in Germany 
than in all of the GIPS economies (Figure 6), and since public discussions of recent ECB decisions 
were quite aware of the fact that the rise of interest rates that would be justified by reference to 
Germany might destroy all hopes of recovery in countries like Spain.  
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Procedure and they will be controlled by the Commission’s discretionary 
interventions under the Excessive Imbalance Procedure.  
These conditions contrast unfavorable with those that were faced by member states 
of the former European Monetary System. Though politically committed to pegged 
exchange rates, their governments had retained autonomous control over all 
instruments of macroeconomic policy – which they were able employ with a view to 
their own economy, its external environment, their own political priorities and 
constraints. At the same time, however, the governments of EMS member states were 
fully accountable to their own constituents for all outcomes that could be attributed 
to failures of macroeconomic management.  
But the proposed EMU regime contrasts also with the conditions faced by the 
member governments of a federal nation state with economically heterogeneous 
regions. These will be deprived of all instruments of macroeconomic management, 
and they may also suffer from the negative impulses of uniform monetary policies of 
the national central bank that will not fit economic conditions in the region. But if the 
monetary policy of the central government may be as much part of the problem as is 
true in the EMU, its fiscal policy will be very much a part of the solution. Generally, 
the budget of the central government is large, its revenues are based on taxes that 
have a major impact on economic activity, and its expenditures include the programs 
that are most affected by the rise and decline of economic activity. Hence the national 
budget will raise most of its revenue in high-growth regions, and it will spend most 
in depressed regions. Quite apart from any intergovernmental transfer programs, 
therefore, national taxation and national social policy will have powerful inter-
regional equalization effects. Moreover, and perhaps even more important, the 
democratic accountability of the central government will be as strong or stronger 
than that of lower-level governments – and so will be its motivation to employ its 
policy instruments with a view to the potential political responses of voters in 
depressed regions.  
Compared to both of these regimes, therefore, member states in the reformed 
Monetary Union will indeed find themselves in the worst of three worlds. Like the 
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provinces or cantons in a federal state, they lose control over the instruments of 
macroeconomic management, and they are likely to suffer from uniform national 
policies that do not fit their regional economy. At the same time, however, the EU 
budget is miniscule in comparison to the budget of federal states, there are no 
European taxes and there is no European social policy to alleviate interregional 
imbalances. Instead, member states are expected to cope with all economic problems 
by relying entirely on their own policy resources. In contrast to members of the 
earlier EMS, however, EMU member states cannot use these policies autonomously, 
but are subject to the intrusive supervision and potential punishment imposed by 
supranational authorities – which are not themselves democratically accountable and 
have no reason to be politically responsive to the citizens affected by their policies. In 
fact, no democratically accountable national government in a federal state has ever 
claimed such control over the fiscal, economic and social policy choices of its 
constituent provinces, states, Länder or cantons.  
 
Is there a hidden agenda of EMU reforms? 
Assuming that the new regime could be installed as it is designed, its economic 
success would seem to depend on the capacity of the Commission to prevent 
macroeconomic imbalances by issuing precise policy instructions (named 
“recommendations”) to member-state governments. In order to succeed on these 
terms, moreover, such instructions would have to fit the economic conditions and 
trends in seventeen heterogeneous member economies. And they would need to 
work under the specific conditions and constraints of industrial organizations, labor-
market institutions, administrative capabilities, and political structures in each of 
these countries. Considering the dismal record of economic forecasts and the lack of 
empirically grounded theory representing the complex linkages among 
heterogeneous economic, social and political structures and processes, that seems to 
imply a staggering research agenda. In this light, the Excessive Imbalance Procedure 
might well be seen as an extreme manifestation of the “pretense of knowledge” of 
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which Friedrich August von Hayek, in his Nobel lecture of 1974 had accused the 
economic policy makers of the Keynesian era.  
Conceivably, however, what the Commission has in mind is something that is 
intellectually much less demanding. It should be remembered that EMU-friendly 
economists have always downplayed the fact that the Eurozone was not an “optimal 
currency area” (Jonung/Drea 2010). In the words of the ECB’s former Chief 
Economist, it was sufficient that member economies should respond to asymmetric 
shocks  
 “with a high degree of flexibility in the markets for goods and 
services…. This flexibility is needed above all in the labor market, that 
is, wages must adjust to changing market conditions … The more the 
price system (in the widest sense) bears the burden of adjustment, the 
less important is the loss of the national exchange rate and monetary 
policy instruments, and the greater the benefit of using a single 
currency…”  
And moreover: “Conditions such as the necessary market flexibility 
can also be created after entry into monetary union.” (Issing 2009, 48-
50).  
If this should be the underlying theory of the present EMU reforms,30 it also makes 
sense that many of the requirements imposed by the “Memoranda of 
Understanding” for Greece and Ireland appear unlikely to reduce public-sector 
deficits over the short or medium term. Instead, they will impose a wide range of 
market-making “structural reforms” that will weaken union power, privatize public 
services, liberalize the professions and open public health care and education to 
commercial service providers.  
Obviously, instructions of this type will not have to overcome prohibitive empirical 
and theoretical difficulties. All they need for guidance are the relatively simple 
supply-side presumptions that are derived from the abstract models of neoclassical 
                                                        
30 I am not here trying to assess its economic plausibility. Would greater market flexibility have 
prevented the credit financed housing booms in Ireland and Spain (or in the USA)? And would 
decentralized wage negotiations have allowed better responses to the German recession than the 
economically sophisticated bargaining strategy of powerful IG-Metall? 
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micro-economics. In that perspective, then, the intended practice of the Excessive 
Imbalance Procedure would become another instrument for promoting market-
liberalism in the European Union. This tendency has characterized European 
legislation and decisions of the European Court of Justice since the early 1980s − and 
it is in the process of transforming the “social market economies” of some EU 
member states into “liberal market economies (Jabko 2006; Scharpf 2010).  
But the reach of “hard” European law is still limited, and the Commission’s use of 
the “soft” methods of the “Lisbon Process” have not been very successful in 
promoting “flexibility” in areas where EU member states were still defending their 
own competences. The “Excessive Imbalance Procedure”, however, might now allow 
the Commission to pursue its liberalizing agenda much more widely and effectively. 
Its “recommendations” merely need to be justified by reference to a list of indicators 
of “economic imbalance” − but there is no constraint on the policy changes that may 
be required. As long as it is alleged that they may somehow have an effect on 
imbalances, the requirements may specify policy changes in a completely undefined 
range of national competences − including areas like labor relations, education or 
health care that have been explicitly protected against European legislation in 
successive versions of the Treaties. And to prevent intergovernmental bargaining 
from softening the sanctions against non-complying governments, the fines 
proposed by the Commission would be adopted by “reverse qualified-majority” 
voting in the Council. So it all seems to fit neatly. 
 
VI: Democratic Legitimacy in a Reformed Monetary Union 
Instead of continuing on the slippery slope toward politico-economic conspiracy 
theories, however, I will now turn to issues of democratic legitimacy. From the 
perspective of citizens in Greece, Ireland and Portugal, the European and 
international agencies imposing the “rescue-cum-retrenchment” program are not, 
themselves, supported by democratic legitimacy. What matters, therefore, is the 
relationship between citizens and the national governments that are accountable to 
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them. But, as I said in the introduction, accountability has an input-oriented and an 
output-oriented dimension.  
“Output-oriented legitimacy” reflects popular responses to outcomes that may be 
attributed to the policy output of the government whose performance is in issue. 
Here, the first general observation is that voters cannot be required to be fair, and 
that governments may be punished for outcomes they did not control. The second 
general point is that electoral responses will reflect relative judgments: Three million 
unemployed in Germany may be a political disaster or a celebrated success 
depending on the figures in recent years. With that in mind, the “rescue-cum-
retrenchment” regime that is presently imposed on GIPS countries can only be 
considered a political disaster. Two-digit and still rising rates of unemployment, 
wage cuts, and rising social inequality will surely not generate outcome satisfaction. 
Under such conditions, GIPS governments cannot hope to benefit from output-
oriented legitimacy.  
But that does not, by itself, rule out the possibility of input-oriented legitimation. 
Democracy is about collective self-determination, rather than about wish fulfillment. 
It is compatible with the need to respect external constraints, and it may also support 
hard choices and painful sacrifices − provided that these can be justiﬁed in public 
discourses as being effective and normatively appropriate in dealing with common 
problems or achieving the collective purposes of the polity (Schmidt 2002; 2006). At 
the same time, however, input-oriented democratic legitimacy does presuppose the 
possibility of politically meaningful choices, and it is not at all compatible with a 
situation where choices are pre-empted by external domination (Pettit 1997).  
Margaret Thatcher, for example, was able to gain political support for extremely 
painful retrenchment and structural reforms in Britain after the “Winter of 
Discontent” of 1979. But in comparison to GIPS governments, Thatcher could appeal 
to traditional British values to justify sacrifices that she found to be economically 
necessary and normatively appropriate (Schmidt 2000, 238-242). Moreover, all 
relevant policy parameters were under the control of her (unitary) national 
government. And most importantly, her program was entirely self-chosen, 
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hammered out over several years in intra-party battles, publicly defended in a 
successful electoral campaign, and supported by a considerable part of public 
opinion.  
Like Thatcher, the present Greek and Irish governments may, at least for a while, 
benefit from blaming present hardships on their political predecessors. But they must 
still struggle with the perception that the “understandings” they had to sign in order 
to obtain the guarantees of the Financial Stability Fund read less like self-chosen 
programs than like protocols of an unconditional surrender. Thus in order to be able 
to hang on, they may desperately need to negotiate for politically visible European 
“concessions” and for permission to adopt at least some “non-liberal” policies to 
alleviate the worst plight of their constituents. If they should fail, and if changes of 
governments would not seem to make a difference, the legitimacy of the democratic 
regime itself may be in danger – especially in polities where democratic government 
is itself a relatively recent achievement. 
To a lesser degree, the same problems may also arise in consequence of measures 
required and sanctioned by the Excessive Deficit or Imbalance Procedures. In some 
countries, of course, market-liberal discourses may be highly persuasive, and 
governments would have no difficulty in presenting “structural reforms” as 
autonomous and justifiable national policy choices. But where the Commission’s 
requirements would violate the politically salient interests, preferences and values of 
national constituencies, compliance may again undermine democratic legitimacy. 
That is not meant to suggest that we will soon see more banks burning and blood in 
the streets of Athens, Dublin or Madrid, or of Helsinki and Berlin for that matter. In 
general, citizens in European countries have less to gain and more to lose from open 
rebellion than was true in Tunisia, Egypt or Libya. And the most vulnerable victims 
of retrenchment and liberalization policies may lack the capabilities and resources for 
effective political action.  
But political resignation, alienation and cynicism, combined with growing hostility 
against “Frankfurt” and “Brussels”, and a growing perception of zero-sum conflict 
between the donors and the recipients of the “rescue-cum-retrenchment” programs, 
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may create the conditions for anti-European political mobilization from the extremes 
of the political spectrum. In the worst case, therefore, the attempts to save the Euro 
through the policies presently enacted may either fail on their own terms, or they 
may not only undermine democracy in EU member states but endanger European 
integration itself.  
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Figure 3 
 
Figure 4 
 
Source: OECD 
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Figure 5 
 
Source: OECD 
Figure 6 
 
Source: Own Calculation by OECD Data 
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Figure 7 
 
Source: OECD 
Figure 8 
 
Deflator Private Consumption. Source: Ameco Database 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Unemployment Rates (Age 25–64)
Germany Greece Ireland Portugal Spain
90
100
110
120
130
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Real Compensation per Employee, 2000 = 100
Germany Greece Ireland Portugal Spain
Fritz W. Scharpf 
 
45   
Figure 9 
 
Index scale of 0 – 6 from weakest to strongest protection. Source: OECD 
Figure 10 
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Figure 11 
 
Source: Own Calculation by OECD Data 
Figure 12 
 
Source: Ameco Database 
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Figure 13 
 
Ratio of compensation per employee to real GDP per person employed. Source: Ameco Database 
Figure 14 
 
Source: OECD 
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Figure 15 
 
Source: Ameco Database 
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Figure 17 
 
Based on Unit Labour Costs (Total Economy). Source: Ameco Database 
Figure 18 
Source: OECD 
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Figure 19 
 
Figure 20 
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